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nominally safety regulations, by a dubious interpretation of an
arbitration award passed by a board with doubtful national power
is really laying bare the health of the federal system to the evils of a
wide-open Pandora's Box. If settlement of controversies involving
labor and interstate commerce does require such arbitration awards
to be omnipotent, let us wait until Congress speaks with more
"drastic clarity."
I. Kendrick Wells
AwN-TRusT ConvmvcrAI. BANKIc-PRoDucr TEST FoR EREsrANT OF
TRADE AND Arx T TO MONOPOLZME UNDEa THE Snsuovt Acr.--The
government charged that a proposed merger between the first and
fourth largest commercial banks in an isolated market, which would
result in a merged bank having over one-half of the total assets, loans
and deposits of all commercial banks within the area, would violate
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The district court held that no
violation of either sections 1 or 2 was shown. Held: Reversed. When
merging corporations are major competitors in a relevant market, as
denoted by the percentage share of the market, the elimination of
this competition constitutes a violation of section 1. United States v.
First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
Recently, two important decisions have brought within the scope
of anti-trust laws a new and distinct "line of commerce'-commercial
banking.' Because of the long run historical movement of concentra-
tion in this field, this would appear to be a future fertile field of
federal litigation. Accordingly, it would appear beneficial to examine
what the Supreme Court considers the product market to be and
whether this definition would result in a realistic test of competition
in a majority of cases.
Several necessary assumptions have been made in order to narrow
this discussion to the single problem of denoting the Court's definition
and examining its general validity. These assumptions are that the
federal courts have jurisdiction, that a reduction of competition in
this field is an evil that should be prohibited, that concentration
figures give a realistic picture of competition, and that the product
market of commercial banking can be examined in the same way as
that of any manufacturing industry.2
1 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 876 U.S. 665 (1963); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2 The writer does not pass upon the economic validity of these assumptions,
but it is believed that all are implicit in the Court's consideration of the problem.
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In the Philadelphia Bank case, the Court stated: "[W]e have no
difficulty in determining the 'line of commerce'... in which to appraise
the probable competitive effects of Appellees proposed merger" and
continued by describing it as: "[T]he cluster of products (various
kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts and trust
administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking'. . . ." This
was justified by the Court in pointing out three distinct products and
services that have a competitive edge over any similar ones. Those
mentioned were demand deposits, inherent to commercial banks;
short term personal credit, insulated because the banks themselves
supply their competitors with funds; and time deposits which although
competitive enjoy a settled consumer preference. 4
Evidently these three products are so important and inseparable
from other commodities of commercial banks that the Court deals
with concentration ratios of total assets, loans and deposits of com-
mercial banks within the relevant geographical areaY This same
process is repeated in the First Nat'l Bank case.6
To check the validity of this approach, let us examine these
denoted products for competition on a national scale and also whether
or not they are so inclusive as to justify the use of ratios for total
assets, loans and deposits.
Obviously, other than coin and currency, there are no sub-
stitutes for demand deposits. They make up the majority of our money
supply, and no financial institution other than commercial banks offers
any product with such a high degree of liquidity.7
Time deposits, on the other hand, are subject to competition from
other institutions usually called saving institutions." These usually
include mutual savings banks, saving and loan associations and life
insurance companies. The Court pointed to this competition but
concluded that time deposits were insulated by consumer preference.
This may be true in certain local areas, but it appears difficult to
justify on a general or national scale. In 1961, the year in which the
complaint was filed in the First Natl Bank case, time deposits of
commercial banks accounted for approximately one-third of the total
saving services provided by these four types of financial institutions. 9
Excluding life insurance companies from computations increases com-
3 874 U.S. at 856.
4Id. at 856-57.
5 Id. at 881, 864.
6 876 U.S. at 668-69.7 Steiner, Shapiro & Solomon, Money and Banking 41, 75 (4th ed. 1958).
S Id. at 75.
9 .50 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1554-67 (1964).
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mercial banks' share to slightly more than one-half of the total.
Therefore, as a general proposition, consumer preference may be
somewhat overstated.
Personal credit would appear to denote consumer credit loans and
loans to individuals which are usually of short duration. This area
of short term credit is usually accepted as being dominated by
commercial banks due to their pressing need for a high degree of
liquidity.10
From this base, the Court concludes that the most effective test of
competition among commercial banks in a given area is to use con-
centration ratios of all commercial banks' assets, loans and deposits.
Although this test considers the effect of a merger upon both bor-
rowers and depositors, it includes some products which are heavily
competitive with offerings of saving institutions and others which are
not even available to the general public. Using the classifications of
the federal reserve, it is apparent that some of these categories, if
included without their close substitutes, could result in large over-
statements of market power." Three of the more important of these
are real estate credit, agricultural loans, and loans to financial institu-
tions. In 1961, commercial banks held only eighteen per cent of the
total amount of real estate credit held by all financial institutions.
2
This type of loan, however, accounted for more than one-fourth of
total commercial bank loans.13 Agricultural loans are also subject to
much outside competition from lending agencies of the federal gov-
ernment.'4 Finally, loans to financial institutions, although not com-
petitive, fail to reflect a category available to the general public and
in the vast majority of banks are of little significance. 15 These three
types account for thirty-eight per cent of total loans of all commercial
banks, and it is apparent that their inclusion without accompanying
competitive data from other financial institutions and governmental
agencies, if present, may well lead to exaggerated concentration ratios.
In the First Nat'l Bank case, the exclusion of only one type of saving
institution, saving and loan associations, from the computations of
total assets and deposits resulted in a twelve per cent increase in the
merging bank's share.'0 Compounding this problem is the fact that
10 Steiner, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139-43.
"150 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1558 (1964).
12Id. at 1579.
13 Id. at 1558.
14 Johnson, The Credit Programs Supervised by the Farm Credit Administra-
tion, in Federal Credit Agencies 259, 266-67 (1963); Steiner, op. cit. supra note
7, at 140.
15 50 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1558 (1964) (country banks).
16Record, p. 887, United States v. First Nat'l Bank 8 Trust Co., 376 U.S. 66$
(1963).
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data for all types of outside competition may be impossible or im-
practical to obtain.
Since difficulties may arise when total asset, loan and deposit ratios
are used, perhaps a better test may be constructed by utilizing an
inherent requirement of commercial banks-liquidity. Because of the
nature of the liabilities of commercial banks, their loans are, for the
most part, of a short term nature. In addition, this type is subject to
less outside competition. 7 Again utilizing the broad categories pro-
vided by the federal reserve, most of the short term type would
appear to be contained in commercial and industrial loans, loans for
securities, and loans to individuals.18 These three account for over
sixty per cent of total commercial bank loans, and coupled with
competitive-free demand deposits would result in an asset/liability
test, considering both borrower and depositor, that would generally
yield a more accurate measurement of competition between inherent
functions of commercial banks. This in turn would provide a much
more realistic picture of concentration among commercial banks.
Although this test would not lead to ratios with the high degree of
consistency now enjoyed, it would appear reasonable to expect some
type of correlation between the loan and deposit sectors because of
the similarity in the degree of liquidity. Even with this drawback,
this test, in the majority of cases, would appear more likely to test
competition among commercial banks, which, after all, is the essence
of the problem.
Stephen H. Johnson
CoNsUTONAL LAw-PoLucE PowER-A.Esmnc NUISANCE.-Appel-
lants challenged the constitutionality of the Billboard Act.' With
minor exceptions, the act prohibits the erection of any "advertising
device" within 660 feet of the right-of-way of any interstate highway,
limited access highway, or turnpike. Held: The act is a constitutional
exercise of the state police power. Moore v. Ward, 877 S.W.2d 881
(Ky. 1964).
Appellants contended there was a procedural error in the refusal
of the circuit court to admit evidence indicating no relationship exists
17 Steiner, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139-43.
1 Ibid., 50 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1558 (1964).
1Ky. Rev. Stat. 177.830-.990 (1960) [hereinafter cited as KES].
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